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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Kenny Carl Struhs appeals from the judgment of conviction and restitution
order entered upon his guilty plea to vehicular manslaughter. Struhs claims the
district court erred in awarding restitution for insurance premiums paid by Struh's
victim's widow prior to sentencing and that the district court abused its
sentencing discretion.

Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings
Brent Hansen, a young father of five children, was taking his six-year-old
daughter on a motorcycle ride one day when Struhs, who was driving with a
blood alcohol content of .157, failed to stop at an intersection, causing Brent's
motorcycle to collide with the side of Struhs' Blazer. (R., pp.15, 22; Sent. Tr.,
p.11, Ls.15-16.)

Brent's motorcycle caught on fire and Brent suffered major

trauma to his head.

(R., p.22.)

Brent died that same day.

(R., p.23.)

Fortunately, Brent's daughter survived but was understandably "very traumatized
by what she saw and experienced." (Sent. Tr., p.13, Ls.18-22; see R., p.22.)
Although Struhs was aware of the collision, he fled the scene, driving in
an erratic manner, nearly hitting some children who were playing outside and a
mother who was putting her four-year-old son inside her car. (R., pp.15, 23, 27.)
Struhs wrecked his car into a chain link fence shortly thereafter.

(R., p.15.)

When law enforcement confronted Struhs, he was clearly under the influence
and "stated he knew he was too drunk to drive." (R., p.15.) Struhs self-reported
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drinking anywhere between eight and 15 beers before getting behind the wheel.
(R., pp.15-16.)
The state charged Struhs with vehicular manslaughter and felony leaving
the scene of an accident.

(R., pp.112-113.)

Pursuant to a plea agreement,

Struhs pied guilty to vehicular manslaughter and the state agreed to dismiss the
leaving the scene charge; there was no agreement as to sentencing. (Change of
Plea Tr., p.4, Ls.7-11, p.16, Ls.21-23; R., pp.136-143.)

The court imposed a

unified 15-year sentence with 10 years fixed. (R., pp.190-192.) The court also
ordered Struhs to pay restitution, including $761.85 for three months worth of
insurance premiums paid by Brent's widow, Emilie. (R., pp.207-214.)
Struhs filed a timely notice of appeal from the judgment of conviction. (R.,
pp.197-199.)
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ISSUES
Struhs states the issues on appeal as:
1.

Did the district court abuse its discretion by ordering Mr.
Struhs to pay the cost of medical insurance purchased by
the victim's wife after the victim's death, as it was not a
direct consequence of Mr. Struhs' criminal conduct?

2.

Did the district court abuse its discretion by imposing upon
Mr. Struhs a unified sentence of 15 years, with 10 years
fixed, stemming from his guilty plea to vehicular
manslaughter, in light of the mitigating factors that exist in
this case?

(Appellant's Brief, p.3.)

The state rephrases the issues as:
1.

Does the Idaho Supreme Court's recent opinion in State v. Straub, 153
Idaho 882, 292 P .3d 273 (2013), preclude an award of restitution for
insurance premiums, equal to the amount previously paid by the
decedent's employer, incurred between the date of the offense and the
date of sentencing?

2.

Has Struhs failed to show a unified 15-year sentence with 10 years fixed
for vehicular manslaughter is an abuse of discretion based on the nature
of the offense and the character of the offender?
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ARGUMENT
I.
Struhs Has Failed To Show The District Court Abused Its Discretion In Awarding
Restitution For The Insurance Premiums Paid By The Victim's Widow
A.

Introduction
Following her husband's death, Emilie Hansen lost her health insurance

coverage, which was provided through her husband's employer. (Rest. Hrg. Tr.,
p.11, Ls.12-16.) Emilie therefore had to obtain new insurance coverage and the
district court awarded her $761.85 in restitution for three months worth of health
insurance premiums paid between the date of the offense and the date of
sentencing. 1 Struhs asserts the district court abused its discretion by awarding
restitution for these premiums, claiming "[u]nder Idaho law, medical insurance
purchased after the victim's death is not considered a direct consequence of the
defendant's criminal conduct and, thus, is not awardable under I.C. § 19-5304."
(Appellant's Brief, p.4.) A review of the authority upon which Struhs relies shows
the Idaho Supreme Court has not squarely addressed whether a court may
properly award restitution for insurance premiums paid between the date of the
offense and the date of sentencing. The district court correctly concluded such
an award was appropriate.

B.

Standard Of Review
The decision whether to order restitution and in what amount is committed

to the trial court's discretion. State v. Hill, 154 Idaho 206, 211, 296 P.3d 412,

1

The district court also awarded restitution for other losses, which Struhs does
not challenge on appeal. (R., pp.207-214; Appellant's Brief, p.4 n.4.)
4

417 (Ct. App. 2013). The trial court's factual findings in relation to restitution will
not be disturbed if supported by substantial evidence. State v. Straub, 153 Idaho
882, 885, 292 P.3d 273, 276 (2013).

C.

The Restitution Award For Three Months Of Insurance Premiums Was
Appropriate
Idaho Code § 19-5304(2) authorizes a court to "order a defendant found

guilty of any crime which results in an economic loss to the victim to make
restitution to the victim." For purposes of Idaho's restitution statute, a "victim"
includes any "person or entity, who suffers economic loss or injury as the result
of the defendant's criminal conduct and shall also include the immediate family
of . . . the actual victim in homicide cases."

I.C. § 19-5304(1 )(e)(i).

"Manslaughter is included in the category of homicide cases." Straub, 153 Idaho
at 888, 292 P.3d at 279 (citing State v. Ellington, 151 Idaho 53, 65, 253 P.3d
727, 739 (2011 )).

"Economic loss" includes, but is not limited to, "lost wages,

and direct out-of-pocket losses or expenses, such as medical expenses resulting
from the criminal conduct." I.C. § 19-5304(1 )(a).
Included in the state's motion for restitution was $761.85 for insurance
premiums for three months.

(R., pp.167, 180.) At the restitution hearing, the

prosecutor explained that Emilie had to obtain health insurance after her
husband died because the insurance was previously being provided through
Brent's employer.

(Rest. Hrg. Tr., p.11, Ls.12-16.)

The state requested

premiums for December 2012 and January-February 2013. (Rest. Hrg. Tr., p.11,
Ls.19-20.)

This timeframe begins after the vehicular manslaughter, which
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occurred on August 2, 2012 (R., p.15), and before the sentencing hearing, which
occurred on March 12, 2013 (R., p.188).

The court awarded Emilie the

requested amount for insurance premiums, concluding it was an "out-of-pocket
expense [that] directly resulted from Struhs' criminal conduct." (R., p.213.)
On appeal, Struhs contends the district court's restitution award for
insurance premiums is precluded by the Idaho Supreme Court's recent opinion in
Straub, supra. (Appellant's Brief, pp.5.) Straub may, however, be distinguished.
Straub pied guilty to vehicular manslaughter for the death of David
Webster. Straub, 153 Idaho at 884, 292 P.3d at 275. The district court awarded
restitution for several categories of expenses including "expenses in securing
three years of medical insurance coverage; coverage that was previously
provided through the Decedent's employer."

&

at 887, 292 P.3d at 278. That

portion of the restitution award included "twelve months of medical insurance
premiums paid to date, and $30,697.20 for the balance of already purchased

&

future medical insurance premiums."

at 887-888, 292 P.3d at 278-279.

Straub appealed the "award of future medical insurance premiums."
292 P.3d at 281.

&

at 890,

The Idaho Supreme Court concluded such losses were not

compensable as restitution, stating:
On the award of future medical insurance premiums, Straub
specifically disputes the $30,697.20 for "anticipate insurance
premiums." According to the district court, these future premiums
are not based on speculation. The premiums are for continuation
of the COBRA health coverage program that the Websters'
purchased after the accident but before the restitution hearing.
However, there is a distinction between medical expenses and
medical insurance. Medical expenses are expressly included in the
definition for economic loss in I.C. § 19-5304(1 )(a) if they are a
direct result of the criminal conduct. In contrast, the acquisition of
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medical insurance does not directly correlate as a direct
consequence of the criminal conduct. Although it is foreseeable
that the death of the lone family breadwinner would leave the family
without health insurance, foreseeability does not equal a "direct"
result.
Straub, 153 Idaho at 890, 292 P.3d at 281.
Because Straub did not challenge the restitution award for premiums paid
prior to the restitution hearing, but instead only challenged future premiums
related to the acquisition of insurance for future months, the Court's opinion does
not squarely address the question presented in this case. Struhs acknowledges
as much, but contends "the Court's holding is not based upon when the expense
occurred; rather, the Court's holding is based upon its finding that purchasing
medical insurance is not a 'direct consequence' of the criminal conduct."
(Appellant's Brief, pp.5-6.) That is true, but only in the context as it relates to the
"anticipated insurance premiums" Straub was challenging. Straub, 153 Idaho at
890, 292 P.3d at 281. The district court in this case did not, however, award
restitution for anticipated insurance premiums;

it awarded restitution for

premiums Emilie already paid and had to pay after Struhs killed her husband
because her husband's employer previously provided those benefits.

In that

sense, the insurance premiums are akin to lost wages, which are expressly
identified as an "economic loss" in I.C. § 19-5304(1 )(a). 2

As recognized in

Straub, "actual out-of-pocket medical expenses and lost wages up to the date of

2

Because the lost premiums are akin to lost wages, the state acknowledges that
restitution would only be appropriate in an amount equal to that being paid by the
employer. Remand for determination of the difference between the amount
Emilie was awarded, and the amount previously paid by her husband's employer
may, therefore, be appropriate.
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sentencing may be included in a restitution order consistent with the language of
I.C. § 19-5304." Straub, 153 Idaho at 889, 292 P.3d at 280. When considered
as a component of lost wages, restitution for insurance premiums paid up to the
date of sentencing is appropriate.
The district court's restitution award was not directly contrary to Straub
and was consistent with compensable losses under the restitution statute.
Struhs has, therefore, failed to establish the district court abused its discretion in
awarding restitution for insurance premiums paid prior to sentencing.

II.
Struhs Has Failed To Show The District Court Abused Its Sentencing Discretion
A.

Introduction
Struhs contends the district court abused its sentencing discretion "in light

of his remorse, his alcohol addiction and willingness to seek treatment, and the
support he has from family and friends."

(Appellant's Brief, p.6.)

The record

supports the sentence imposed.

B.

Standard Of Review
"Where the sentence imposed by a trial court is within statutory limits, the

appellant bears the burden of demonstrating that it is a clear abuse of
discretion."

State v. Miller, 151 Idaho 828, 834, 264 P.3d 935, 941 (2011)

(quotations and citations omitted). "In deference to the trial judge, this Court will
not substitute its view of a reasonable sentence where reasonable minds might
differ." Id.
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C.

A Unified 15-Year Sentence With 10 Years Fixed For Vehicular
Manslaughter Is Not Excessive
"[T)he most fundamental requirement [of sentencing] is reasonableness."

Miller, 151 Idaho at 834, 264 P.3d at 941 (quotations and citation omitted).
"When reviewing the reasonableness of a sentence this Court will make an
independent examination of the record, having regard to the nature of the
offense, the character of the offender and the protection of the public interest."

lf:L.

A review of the record demonstrates that a unified 15-year sentence with 10

years fixed for the death of Brent Hansen that resulted from Struhs driving under
the influence is not excessive. Struhs has failed to establish otherwise.
The four objectives of sentencing are well-established.

They are "(1)

protection of society; (2) deterrence of the individual and the public generally; (3)
the possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution."

State v.

Knighton, 143 Idaho 318, 319-320, 144 P.3d 23, 24-25 (2006) (quotations and
citations omitted). "A sentence need not serve all sentencing goals; one may be
sufficient."

State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 285, 77 P.3d 956, 974 (2003)

(citing State v. Waddell, 119 Idaho 238, 241, 804 P.2d 1369, 1372 (Ct. App.
1991 )).
In imposing sentence, the court noted the objectives of sentencing and
the statutory factors to consider in determining whether to place Struhs on
probation or to impose a sentence of incarceration. (Sent. Tr., p.42, L.24 - p.43,

LS.) The court then noted "some things" it found "very important in this case,"
including Struhs' criminal history and Struhs' "atrocious" driving record. (Sent.
Tr., p.44, Ls.5-9.) That history shows Struhs has seven convictions for driving
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without privileges and convictions for failing to stop at an accident, inattentive
driving, driving under the influence (amended from felony aggravated driving
under the influence), and disturbing the peace. (PSI, pp.5-9.) Struhs also has
three convictions for open container.

(PSI, pp. 7, 9-10.) The court also noted

Struhs' "severe substance abuse problem." (Sent. Tr., p.45, L.12.) Based on
the circumstances, Struhs' history, and the "paramount" need to protect society,
the court imposed a unified 15-year sentence with 10 years fixed.

(Sent. Tr.,

p.51, Ls.2-12.)
In claiming the court abused its sentencing discretion, Struhs notes that
"[f]rom his first contact with the police throughout the criminal proceedings, [he]
took responsibility and expressed remorse for his crime." (Appellant's Brief, p.7.)
This assertion, while technically true, essentially ignores the fact that Struhs fled
the scene after colliding with Brent and was confronted by law enforcement
shortly thereafter because he wrecked his car.

Taking "responsibility" at that

point was certainly in his best interest.
Struhs next cites his remorse as a mitigating circumstance. (Appellant's
Brief, pp.7-8.) The court addressed this specifically at sentencing, stating:
The presentence report writer indicates that they [sic] saw
very little remorse on your part for this accident. You've expressed
that sorrow here today. It's hard to understand whether that sorrow
exists or not by just reading paper. And only you know. I know it's
been expressed here today. But at the same time, I'm not sure you
completely grasp the severity of your substance abuse problem
and how it's played into your life.
(Sent. Tr., p.47, Ls.10-18.) The court gave Struhs' purported remorse all the
consideration it was due.
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As for Struhs' alcoholism, upon which he relies, as explained by the Idaho
Supreme Court in State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 727, 170 P.3d 387, 392 (2007),
the defendant's "serious alcohol problem" did not require a reduction in his
sentence for felony driving under the influence.

Rather, Oliver's history of

alcohol abuse and crimes related thereto "show[ed] the proper exercise of
discretion," not the abuse of discretion claimed by Oliver.

19.c

Finally, Struhs cites the support he has from his sister and others who find
him caring, giving, kind, and loving.

(Appellant's Brief, pp.8-9.)

This is little

comfort when that support does not deter Struhs from abusing alcohol and
driving under the influence. Neither this factor, nor any other factor Struhs cites,
demonstrates an abuse of the district court's sentencing discretion.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the judgment of
conviction and order of restitution.
DATED this 11

th

day of February, 2014.

JES~
Deputy Attorney General
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 11 th day of February, 2013, served a
true and correct copy of the attached BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by causing a
copy addressed to:
JASON C. PINTLER
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
to be placed in The State Appellate Public Defender's basket located in the
Idaho Supreme Court Clerk's office.
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